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Codification of Private International Law: Pros and Cons

FranfoisRigaux'

The last hundred years have been a century of codification of private
international law. The starting-point was the EGBGB which entered into force on
January 1, 1900, but the movement, which relented during the first half century,
received a fresh impulse after the end of World War II. The last thirty years have
been the "thirty glorious years" of recording private international law on the
statutory books. In Europe, the last most striking events ofthat kind were the Swiss
la ,on private international law of December 18, 1987,' and the Italian law
of May 31, 1995.2 Liechtenstein has also adopted new provisions on private
international law in 1997, 3 as well as Russia." Belgium is following suit. At
the end of 1999, the Belgian government sought a consultative opinion from
the Conseil d'Etat on the draft statute containing a code of private international

law.5

Although, on the other side of the Atlantic, "conflicts law and legislation are
still perceived as antithetical themes," 6 two major exceptions have to be mentioned:
the Louisiana Act 923 of 1991 and the new provisions of the Code Civil of
Quebec, which entered into force on January 1, 19940 It is no mere coincidence
that both jurisdictions imported in the first years of the nineteenth century a French

inspired Civil Code. The theme ofthis issue ofthe LouisianaLaw Review has been
purposefully chosen since Professor Symeonides was the much acclaimed reporter
ofthe Louisiana Act.
Copyright 2000, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
*

Professeur emeritus of the Universitt catholique de Louvain; Member of the International

Law Institute.
1. Loi f6d6rale sur le droit international priv6 (LDIP) du 18 d6cembre 1987, Feuijles ftd6rales,
1983 1255, and Message concerant une Ioi f6ddrale sur ledroit international priv6 82-072 (10
novembre 1982).
2. Legge 31 Maggio 1995, N. 218, Riforma del sistema italiano di diritto internazionaleprivato,
Gazzetta Ufficiale, suppl. ord. N. 68 al n. 128 del 3giugno 1995. See Paolo Mengozzi, La riforma del
diritto internazionale privato (Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli 1996).
3. Gesetz vorn Sept. 19, 1996 Olber das internationale Privatrecht, Liechtensteiner
Landesgesetzblatt 1996, Nr 194, Nov. 28, 1996. See Fritz Sturm, Das neue internationale Privatrecht
Liechtensteins, Ludwig Boltzmann Institut for Europarecht, Heft 2, Wien 1997.
4. M.D. Bogouslavski, Le droit international privt en Russie et dans les autres Etats membres
de ]a CEI au seuil du XXle sicle,Clunet 413-34 (1999).
5. Avant-projet de loi portant code de droit international priv6.
6. Symeon C. Symeonides, PrivateInternational Law Codification in a Mixed Jurisdiction:
The LouisianaExperience,57 RabelsZ 460, 461 (1993).
7. Articles 15 through 49 ofAct 923 have been redesignated as Articles 3515 through 3459 to
form Book IV of the Louisiana Civil Code.
8. Loi du 18 ddcembre 1991 ins~rant un nouveau Livre 10 dans le Code civil du Quebec.
French text in 81 Rev. crit. dip 574 (1992). See Patrick Glenn, CodificationofPrivate International
Law in Quebec, IPRaX 308-12 (1994); RabelsZ 231-68 (1996) with both French and English version.
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This present paper does not purport to analyze the various instruments
embodying new rules of private international law. This task would be
tremendous.9 The aim is instead to submit some reflections on the very principle
of codification in private international law."0
The following questions will be dealt with:
*
*
*
*

What are the competing sources of private international law?
What does "codification" mean?
What areas ofprivate international law are better adapted to some kind of
legislative action?
What judgement, if any, can be passed on codification of private
international law?
I. THE SOURCES OF PRIVATE

INTERNATIONAL LAW

The word "sources" has various meanings. It can refer to the origin of
a branch of law, and conveys at the same time a specific approach to it.
When Roman law survived the dislocation of the Empire, it had to compete
with different conflicting statutes (statuta) adopted by local jurisdictions.
Italian scholars such as Bartolo da Sassoferrato (1314-1357) drafted rules to
make a choice between the competing statutes. Those rules were applied by the
courts." Scholarly from its origin, the science ofconflict of laws won access to the
courts.
Conflict law is law on the law. Its realm is beyond the power of any
legislator. The unifying shadow of Roman law lent support to the hope of
overcoming the division of sovereignty through the device of common rules
of conflict. After the invention of international law, tout court conflict rules
found shelter in it. Francisco de Vitoria's ius communicationis, which
justifies the colonial conquests, 2 concerns the relationships between the
subjects of various sovereigns and is more akin to what is now called private

9. See. e.g., Paolo Picone, La riforma italiana del diritto internazionale privato (1998); W.
Riering, IPR-Gesetze in Europa (1997); Symeon C.Symeonides et al., Conflict of laws: American,
Comparative International (1998); Aussereuropaische IPR-Gesetze (1999); Conflictof laws statutes (R.

Maclean ed., 1996).
10. 55 Boris Nolde, La codification du droit international privi,Recueildes cours de l'Acadgmie
de droit international, 303-431 (1936-1); 177 Eric Jayme, Consid6rations historiques sur la
codification du droit international priv6, Recueil des cours . . . ,9-102 (1982-IV).
More recently: Catherine Kessedjian, La codification en droit international priv6, et Emmanuel
Putman, Rdflexions sur la question de la codification en droll international privi,in La codification
du droitinternational, Colloque d'Aix-en-Provence de la Socit6frangaise dedroit international 101-16
(1999); H. Muir Watt, La codification en droit international priv6, Droits 149-60 (1998).
11. See, e.g., Hessel E. Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 Am. J.
Comp. L. 297-317 (1953).
12. De Indis recenter inventis, text of lessons (relectiones) delivered at Salamanca during the last
years ofthe fifteenth century and published on the notes of a student at Lyons in 1537. The quoted text
was revised by H.F. Wright, The Classics of International Law, I1, 1,at 257 (1917).
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international law 3 than to the "public" subdivision ofthe ius inter gentes. Grotius
as well as Vitoria and the seventeenth to eighteenth century school of natural law
do not separate the two branches of international relationships. Vitoria's
justification of colonization is twofold: first is the freedom of communication
between the peoples, and the second is the freedom of evangelization. 4 It is
striking how Story adhered to Vitoria's perspective. He states "The truth is, that the
law of nations, strictly so called, was in a great measure unknown to antiquity, and
is the sole growth ofmodem times, under the combined influence of Christianity
and commerce."' 5 From Blackstone"6 to Phillimore, 7 Lorimer"5 and Wharton, 19 the
law of nations is divided into two realms, the relationships between independent
Christian princes and the dealings of those princes' subjects between themselves.
Continental scholars ofthe nineteenth century, Savigny and Mancini, 2 do not
part company with their Anglo-American colleagues of the same period. All of
them profess international law to encompass the whole field ofhuman intercourse
as between Christian nations and the subjects thereof. Laurent alone takes a more
enlightened position.22 Savigny intends "to establish a scientific basis for conflicts
law, congruent with the international community of law among independent
states."' At the turn of the century another endeavour is gaining ground, namely
the drafting ofinternational treaties in the field ofconflicts law. It is contemporary

13. The expression internationallaw (instead of law ofnations, droit des gens, ius gentium,
Vdlkerrecht) was coined by Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation, chap. XCVII, § 25, at 296 (1st ed. J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Univ. of London,The
Athlone Press, 1970) (1789). Itwas taken up by Etienne Dumont, Traiths de l6gislation civile et p6nale
(1802). Later on Joseph Story denominated private international law the branch ofconflicts of laws:
Commentaries on the Conflicts of Laws, Foreign and Domestic § 9, at 9 (1834). Afterwards Schiffner
used the title Entwicklung des internationalen Privatrechts (1841)) and he was followed by Foelix,

Trait6 du droit international privd ou du conflit des lois de diff6rentes nations en mati/re privde (1843).
14. Vitoria, De Indis, supra note 12, at III, 9, 265.
15. Story, supranote 13, § 3,at 4.
16. W.Blackstone, Commentaries on the laws of England, t. IV,ch. V,at 66(1st ed. 1765-1769,
14th rev. ed. with the last corrections ofthe author, London, Straham, 1803).
17. Sir Robert Phillimore published four volumes from 1854 to 1861, under the same title
Commentaries upon international law. The fourth one (1861) bears a proper title: Commentaries upon
international law, private international law or comity.

18. James Lorimer divides international law into three branches, the third one being private
international law: The Institutes ofthe Law ofNations (W.Blackwood and sons, Edinburg and London,
at 4 (1883).
1883-1884), t. ler,

19.

According to Francis Wharton, private international law is "that part of the law ofnations

which concerns the determination of private claims." Commentaries on Law § 252, at 263
(Philadelphia, Kay & Brother, 1884).
20. Friedrich Carl von Savigny, System des heutigen r6mischen Rechts (Berlin, Veit und Comp.)
t. VIII, § 348, at. 27 (1849).
21. See Eric Jayme, Pasquale Stanislas Mancini (Ebelsbad, Grener, 1980); Tito Ballarino, Diritto

internazionale privato (2da ed. Padova), Cedam, 1996, at 30-34; Jayme, supra note 10, at 39-49.
22. Laurent remains noteworthy for his widening of the community of civilized nations. He
strongly criticizes Savigny's narrow concept of "Christian" peoples: Frangois Laurent, Droit civil
international in eight volumes, t. 1,§ 25, § 39, § 132 f., § 147 f., §413 (1880-1881).
23. Yntema, supra note 11, at 309.
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with the German EGBGB. After World War II, the legislative activity of the
several states and the proliferation of Hague Conventions in specific fields of the
law of conflicts will reach a level that was unknown before.
II. WHAT ISCODIFICATION?
Codification can at first have very broad meaning: enacting a Written
formulation ofthe law. It stands in opposition to non-written law, such as custom.
But custom itself is fashioned after judicial decisions and contractual practices,
which give it some kind of a written formulation. Since customary sources are
scattered and difficult to assess, it is useful to codify them in order to bring them
into a coherent body.
The sources of codification are either international or domestic. Almost all
branches of law can be tackled in an international agreement: not only branches of
international law itself, but also various aspects ofsubstantive domestic law, which
have been submitted to a process of unification or harmonization. Private
international law can be codified either at the international or at the national level.
The codification of public international law can only occur through an interstate
agreement, but states are able to codify their own approach to foreign relations.
Such is the character of the Restatement Third Foreign Relations Law, which is a
form of dusseresStaatsrecht,but not a codification in the proper sense.
In view of the customary origin of international law, codifying that branch of
law purports to give a comprehensive and as complete as possible body of
traditional solutions. The International Law Commission in the field of "public"
international law, and the Hague Conference of private international law in the
"private" sphere are institutions whose mission is one of codification.
Since the days ofthe Justinian Codex iuriscivilisup to the French, the German
and the Swiss "Civil Codes," codification has also had a more ambitious purpose.
It attempts to compress the whole of a branch of law into a comprehensive unit, a
civil code, a penal code, a code of civil or penal proceedings, a code of public
health and so on. It does not attempt to encompass the whole machinery of law, but
only a part of it under the heading of a unifying idea.
The codification of international law, both public and private, has never been
so extended. What is called codification either at Geneva or at the Hague consists
of choosing a specific topic and bringing it into a written form. There does not exist
either a thorough code of international law patterned after a code civil, nor an
international code of private international law.
The first codifications of civil law contained some rules of conflict. This was
the case with the Prussian Code of 1792 and the Code Napoleon of 1804, where a
small number of provisions of private international law were scattered within the
articles of substantive law. The Italian Civil Code of 1865 took a more deliberate
approach through preliminary provisions (disposizionipreliminar)on conflicts of
law, drafted according to the nationality principle under the influence of Mancin.
A similar pattern was followed in the German BGB, whose introductory law
(Einfthrungsgesetz)contained basic rules of private international law.
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The first and the second Italian Codice civile, as well as the German
BirgerlicheGesetzbuch, codified in the same instrument rules of civil law and
conflict of laws rules. The recent Louisiana and Quebec conflict oflaws rules were
formally inserted in the civil codes of those jurisdictions.
Consequently, codification has two different meanings which partially overlap.
One is formal. It produces a complete body oflaw, e.g. a civil or a penal code. Up
to now such an endeavor has not been done in the field of (public) international law,
where codification is always restricted to specific topics. The second meaning is
of a substantive nature and it draws a distinction between two policies of
codification: either fixing existing rules, for instance customary norms, or
imagining original answers to new problems. National codes and international
codification can equally look backward or forward. Some codes have been blamed
for their obsolete character. For instance the French Code deprocddurecivile has
been labelled as being dead before having been born. The German BGB also met
24
with heavy criticism at the very moment when it entered into force.
State legislatures also insert special rules ofconflict into specific statutes. This
is a far cry from codification in the proper sense, even if the legislative intent is to
embody in a unique instrument the substantive and conflict of laws aspects of a
definite problem. While such special conflict of law rules are not inserted in a
codification, there is doubt whether according tothe principle Specialiageneralibus
derogant,they take precedence over the codified general rules ofconflict.
Another problem is the concurrence between a state codification and rules of
conflict embodied into an international instrument. The solution will depend on the
answer given in each jurisdiction to the conflict between international and domestic
law.
III. WHAT AREAS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW ARE BETTER ADAPTED TO
SOME KIND OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION?

It follows from the preceding division that two sources of written law, state
legislation and international treaties, compete in the various areas of private

international law. The problems ofjudiciary jurisdiction and mutual recognition of
judgments are better regulated through the second category ofsources. Indeed, they
are linked with the idea of reciprocity. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article
IV, Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States is more "exacting" when
applied to judgments than to statutes.25 That very provision also indicates that
between international treaties and state legislation there exists a third genus: in a
24. The civil law provisions of the BGB were, from the outset, heavily criticized by such an
influential scholar as Gierke and by the Freirechtslehre. Some specialists ofprivate international law
addressed specific critics to the EG: Theodor Niemeyer, Zur Vorgeschichte des Internationalen
Privatrechts im Deutschen Bargerlichen Gesetzbuch ("Die Gebbardschen Materialen"),
Ver6ffentlichungen des Seminars for Intemationales Recht an der Universitat Kiel, I Heft (Mtlnchen
und Leipzig, Duncker und Humblot, 1915), p. I with references on note 2.
25. See, e.g., Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 231, 118 S.Ct. 657, 663 (1998)
(quoting Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277, 56 S.Ct. 229, 234 (1935)).
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federal system interstate conflicts can be regulated through federal legislation. The
United States Supreme Court has sporadically controlled the application of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause as between sister states,2 6 and during the nineteenth century
the same court did not refrain from setting forth conflict of laws rules." It has been
convincingly argued that Congress would be empowered to pass legislation unifying
international and interstate conflict rules in the United States.2 s Should that be the
case, state codification would be preempted by an Act of Congress just as it can be
controlled by the United States Supreme Court under Article IV, Section 1 of the
Constitution.
The European Community presents rather similar features. In some special
fields, European regulations and directives combine substantive laws with rules of
conflice 9 which preempt state legislation or case law. The unification of the law
applicable to contractual obligations between Member States took the form of an

international treaty, the Convention ofRome ofJune 19, 1980. Their interpretation
can be checked by the Court of Justice of the European Communities but the
European Commission contemplates the transformation of the provisions of the
Brussels Convention on the mutual recognition and enforcement ofjudgments into
a regulation binding upon the states. 0 Subsequently, when codifying their conflict
26. The most famous cases are Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 52 S.Ct. 571
(1932); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 55 S.Ct. 518 (1935);
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 59 S. Ct. 629 (1939). More
recently: Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981); Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutt (Shutt 111), 472 U.S. 797, 105 S.Ct. 2965 (1985). All those cases are interstate cases to which
the Full Faith and Credit Clause is applicable. Intruly international cases, the choice oflaw process
is submitted to the Due Process Clause: Home Ins. Co v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 50 S. Ct. 338 (1930);
Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 84 S.Ct. 1197 (1964); Day and Zimmermann v.Challoner,
423 U.S. 3,96 S.Ct. 167 (1975).
27. Smith v. Condry, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 28 (1843); Dennick v. Railroad Co. of New York, 103
U.S. 11 (1880); Stewart v. Baltimore and O.R. Co., 168 U.S. 445, 18 S. Ct. 105 (1897); Slater v.
Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 24 S.Ct. 581 (1904); Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451,24 S.Ct. 692
(1904); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234,U.S. 542, 34 S.Ct. 955 (1914); Spokane and Inland
R.R. v. Whitley, 237 U.S. 487, 35 S.Ct. 655 (1915).
28. In spite of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938); Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020 (1941). See, e.g., William Winslow Crosskey,
Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States 541-57 (1953); Brainerd Currie,
Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 194, 272 n. 19 (1963); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of
Equaland TerritorialStates: The ConstitutionalFoundationsof ChoiceofLaw, 92 Colum. L. Rev.
249, 331-36 (1992); Willis L. M. Reese et al., Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws 376 (9th ed.
1990).
29. In an abundant doctrine see: Y. Loussouam, Les conflits de lois en matifte de contrat
d'assurance et ]a directive communautaire du 22 juin 1988, Rev. gdn. ass.terr., 291-305 (1989); B.
Smulders & P. Glazener, Harmonization in thefield of insurancelaw through the introduction of
community rules of conflict, Common Market LR, 775-98 (1991); Marc Fallon, La protection
internationalede I'acheteursurl'interrdseaudans le contexte communautaire, in La protection des
consommateurs acheteurs i distance 241, 273-81 (ed.Hildegard &Bemd Stauder Z~rich, Schulthess
Polygraphische Verlag, 1999).
30. The Title IV(articles 61 et seq.) inserted in the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam has
widened the competence of the Council in that field. See Christian Kohler, Interrogationssur les
sourcesdu droitinternationalpriv europien aprisle traitid'Amsterdam, Rev. crit. dip., at 7, 9note
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of law rules, Member States have incorporated the solutions of the Rome
Convention into their national instruments.3 One might have doubts about the
wisdom of duplicating or even multiplying the same substantive wording in legal
instruments of different weight. A legislative enactment, the provision of an
international treaty, a constitutional rule, an EC regulation, and an EC directive
each have a proper status. Their interpretation is governed by different methods,
and they are submitted to emendation or modification by different authorities. The
"pedagogical" intent of state legislation to "codify" into a singular instrument all
relevant rules, whatever the source ofeach ofthem, can only bring more confusion
into a difficult field.
IV.

SOME RELUCTANCE TO CODIFY PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

When drafting conflict of law rules, a state legislature is addressing its own
judiciary, supposing they have jurisdiction in the case at hand, because a state
legislator is not a universal lawgiver. It faces a choice: either delineating the scope
ofapplication ofits sole substantive law or deciding what law, domestic or foreign,
is applicable to the case. Old examples are in favor ofthe first choice: under the
wording of Article 3, section 3, of the French Civil Code, "the laws concerning
status and capacity of persons govern French citizens even residing abroad."
However, in spite ofthe "unilateral" formulation of the conflict rule, the provision
has been applied analogically by submitting aliens to their own national law.32
The German EGBGB raised a more awkward problem of interpretation. When
it was drafted, the dilemma ofadopting either unilateral or multilateral conflict rules
was well known and the legislature combined both methods: some provisions were
unilaterally framed, others not. The legislative history indicated that the intent
embodied in the unilateral provisions was to guarantee only the application of
German law to situations linked with the Reich. The correlative application of
foreign law would depend upon the conclusion of treaties providing for the
application of German law in the foreign jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the
Reichsgericht disregarded the content of the legislative history on that point and it
afforded a multilateral interpretation to the unilaterally framed provision of the
EG.

33

12, 15, 24-25 (1999). See the Act of the Council 98/C 229/01 establishing on the basis of Article K-3
of the Treaty on the European Union the Convention concerning jurisdiction, recognition and
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters, OJEC, C 221, July 16, 1998, p. 1.
31. While Article 27 to 37 of the German Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Internationalen
Privatrechtsof July 25, 1986 reproduce provisions of the Rome Convention, Article 57 ofthe Italian
statute of May 31, 1993, declares that convention applicable in its proper field.
32. That interpretation dates back to a judgment of the Cour d'appel de Paris (June 13, 1814,
Styles v. Busqueta, S 1815, 2, 67). The analogical interpretation of Article 3, section 3, was
emphasized by the Belgian Cour de cassation: (Ire ch.), Jan. 19, 1882, Bauffremont, Pas., 1882, 1,38.
33. RGFeb. 15,1906, RGZ62,400,401-402; Nov. 8,1917,RGZ91,139. The last decision was

all the more noteworthy since during World War Iit concluded to the application of the law of a country
at war with Germany. The same interpretation was reiterated after World War II: BGH May 2, 1966,
8GHZ 45, 351.
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The commentary of the first draft (1881) was written by a public official
(Ministerialrat)of the Grand Duchy of Baden, Alfred Gebhard. The text of that
commentary was not published until 1915. 3" Although Gebhard professed a strict
multilateralism, inobedience to Savigny's doctrine," the provisions ofthe first draft
being drawn up accordingly, some articles were transformed later on into unilateral
rules. The intention to exclude any multilateral interpretation (which was well
known through the French case law) was clearly expressed. However, Gebhard's
multilateralism was submitted to Savigny's restrictive approach. It was limited to
the law of foreign "Christian" nations whose institutions were deemed sufficiently
similar to the German BGB to allow their application in virtue of the German EG. 6
Moreover, the Reichsgericht's decision is interesting for its treatment oflegislative
history. The text of some provisions of the EGBGB is silent on the law applicable
to a situation which is not linked to Germany. That the legislature rejected the
original Gebhard approach did not mean that it adhered to the opposite view. The
courts are thus empowered to fill gaps through an analogical interpretation of the
explicit rule on the applicability of German law although the Bundesrat had
unequivocally condemned such interpretation."'
Among the German scholars who, from the very beginning, criticized the
EGBGB, some different motivations can be traced. Either they were opposed to
codification as such,3" or they were not satisfied with the formulation of unilateral
rules (such was the situation of Gebhard), or they did not approve ofthe content of
some rules. But it is not the same thing to pronounce oneself against codification
as such as it is to be dissatisfied with the content of determinate rules of a
promulgated code.
The principle of codification can be presented either in a spatial or in a time
setting. Small units in a federal entity in being (as Louisiana) or in becoming (as
Belgium within the EU) risk jeopardizing a broader scheme of "unification" by
crystallizing local or national rules ofconflict. 9 One can regret, as many American
34. It was first published by Theodor Niemeyer, supra note 24. More recently scholars have
brought to light other materials of the legislative history of EGBGB: Die geheimen Materialien zur
Kodifikationdes deutschen Internationalen Privatrechis, herausgegeben durch Oskar Hartwieg &

Friedrich Korkisch (Tlbingen, Mohr [Siebeck] 1973); Michael Benn, Die Entstehungsgeschichte der
einseitigen Kollisionsnormen des EGBGB unter besonderer Berilcksichtigung der Haltung des
badischen Redaktors Albert Gebhard und ihre Behandlung durch die Rechtsprechung in
rechtsvergleichenden Sicht (Frankfurt/M, 1980).
35. Hartwieg & Korkisch, supra note 34, at 52-53.
36.

Id. at 58-61.

37.
38.

RGZ 62,1401.
This was the case of Ludwig von Bar, a leading private international lawyer of the time.
Ludwig von Bar, Theorie und Praxis des internationalen Privatrechts, t. I, p. 14 (2.Aufl. Hannover,
1889). According to the new materials unearthed by Hartwieg & Korkisch supranote 34, Bismarck
and the Auswfirtige Amt (Foreign Office) were opposed to codification for two reasons, one was
theoretical (private international law is abranch of V61kerrecht) and another was practical: afterhaving
recognized the application offoreign law before German courts, the Government would be worse off

to negotiate treaties on the basis ofreciprocity.
39. It could be retorted that when called to participate in the drafting of an international
codification, the states which have codified their domestic law have a better say during the
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scholars do, that the United States Supreme Court did not infer from the
Full Faith and Credit Clause its power to draw up common rules of conflict
on the federal level. Such a scheme would have combined two advantages:
the flexibility of case law and the unifying force of a national (federal)
judiciary.
In Europe the problem is not altogether different. The development of the
European Union will enhance the necessity of unifying conflicts rules not only in
the field of contracts (which is already done) but also regarding tort law, family law,
inheritance, and so on. It will be necessary to realize it through written law (treaty
provisions, regulations, directives) put under the harmonizing interpretation ofthe
Court of Justice of the European Communities and with the hope of imaginative
case law. Are national legislative efforts consistent with such a perspective? The

answer is at best dubious.
Two topics still have to be dealt with. The first concerns a scientific,
universalist approach to private international law. The second one is related to the

constitutional validity of conflict of laws rules. In the European Community, the
solutions of private international law have not only to be constitutionally valid and
made in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, but they have also to conform to the economic liberties
guaranteed by the EC Treaty.
If one does not disown the old idea ofprivate international law as a "science," '
which provides for solutions available in a broader context than the national level,

then a science associated with the requirements of an evolving practice, and the
combining of scholarship and case law seems the most rewarding approach.
Anzilotti's criticism of Savigny consists of regretting that the German scholar did
not extend to private international law the lessons of the Historical School on "a
slow, integrational, gradual process" (con unprocessolento, integrativo,graduale)
of the social facts.4' His negative assessment of the German codification in a text
written in 1898 is a complement to a more general evaluation of codification
exposed in Florence on 12 November 1893.42 According to Anzilotti, judge-made
law is better equipped to meet "the scientific and practical needs" (dei bisogni
scientifici e pratici)4 3 The stressing of case law by an Italian scholar, who later
served as ajudge of the Permanent Court ofInternational Justice for eighteen years,
does not need to be underlined. The universalist approach of Anzilotti, which did
not contradict his personal brand of positivism, sustains his hostility to state
deliberations. It is not certain whether the delegates' influence depends more on the existence of a
national codification than on their skill and their country's weight.
40. See, e.g., 234 Bruno Oppetit, Le droit international privg, droil savant, Recueil des cours
331 (1992-Il).

41.

.Anzilotti, Una paginadi storia dellacodificazione civile in Germania in Studi criticididiritto

internazionale privato (1898), reproduced in Opere di D.A., vol. III, Scritti di diritto internazionale

privato 98, 108 (Giuffr6, 1960).
42. La codificazione del diritto intemazionale privato, reproduced in Opere, supra note 41, at 771. His criticism did not spare the Italian provisions of the Civil Code of 1865 (p. 61). Anzilotti was

not in favor of international codification either.
43. Eod. loco, p. 37.
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legislation in the field of private international law." It also explains his criticism
legislature for not making
ofthe dualistic approach ofthe EGBGB and the German
45
a choice between unilateralism and multilateralism
The twofold impact of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and of the Due Process
Clause on the conflict oflaws is familiar to American lawyers.46 Constitutional law
is also law on the law, but when it is combined with rules of conflict, it produces an
alchemy of two bodies of law on the law. The judge is solely apt to arbitrate such
conflicts. The recent evolution of constitutional basic rules, especially a new
approach to the equal protection of the law, has rendered obsolete traditional rules
of conflict which were based on the privilege of masculinity or the discrimination
against children born out ofwedlock. In Germany47 and in Italy,48 the constitutional
court has declared the existing rules of conflict in the field of family law contrary
to the equality principle embodied in the Republican Constitution, and it has
entailed the modernization of those rules by the legislature. The origin of the crisis
was the formulation of the previous norms: the legislator had expressly struck the
balance between husband and wife, between father and mother in favor of the
former. The very broad provision of the French Civil Code retaining the principle
ofnationality without further precision has been flexible enough to accommodate
both sets of norms. It was possible to interpret Article 3, Section 3, of the French
Civil Code in the light of an evolving constitution. If the codification ofprivate
international law goes along with very precise and definite rules, it entertains the
risk of a confrontation with a future evolution of constitutional values. It would
indeed be naive to think that the constitutional law in force at the day of the
codification will never more be modified.
Each Member State of the European Union has to comply with its own
constitutional rules and with the Europeon Human Rights and Individual Freedoms,
as well as the basic liberties guaranteed by the EC Treaty, namely the freedom of
movement of persons. These rules will increasingly exert influence on the
development of conflict of law rules while the European legislature will conquer
broader fields.

44. Una pagina, supra note 41, at 173-77.
45. Eod. loco, p. 137-160.
46. See 234 Peter E. Herzog, Constitutional Limits on Choice of Law, Recueil des cours 239
(1992-rn1).
47. BVerfG May 4, 1971, BVerfGE 31, 73; Feb., 22, 1983, BVerfGE 63, 181; Jan. 8, 1985,
BVerfGE 68,384; Dec. 3, 1985, BVerfGE 71, 224.
48. Cone costituzionale, Mar. 5, 1987, n. 71, Giurispr.Cost. 1987,1, 566; 10 December 1987,
n. 477, Giurispr.Cost., 1987, 11,3234.

